



# Project Completion Report

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## PCR

**Project Name: Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening Program (DLGP)**

**Country: Suriname**

**Sector/Subsector: Reform/ Modernization of the State**

**Original Project Team: Robert Daughters, Project Team Leader (RE3/SC3); Jacob Greenstein (RE3/FI3); Jorge Febres (INT/FIS); Liuz Villela (INT/FIS); Jose de la Torre (LEG); James Campbell (RE3/CSU); Silvano Tjong Ahin (COF/CSU); Ana Lucia Saettone (RE3/SC3)**

**Project Number: SU0019**

**Loan Number (s), TC(s): 1343/OC-SU**

**CRG Date:**

**Final Approval Date of PCR:**

**PCR Team: Principal Author and Members: Rafael de la Cruz, ICF/FMM; Rinia Terborg, CCB/CSU; Silvano Tjong Ahin (CCB/CJA); y Hernan Aspiazu, Consultant.**

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

CSU	IDB Country Office in Suriname
DLGP or DLGP I	Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening. The current program subject of this PCR
DLGP II	Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening II. The Program at present under preparation.
GOS	Government of Suriname
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
LRB	Law of Regional Bodies
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MRD	Ministry of Regional Development
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PIU	Project Implementation Unit

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**I. Basic Information**

<b>BASIC DATA (AMOUNTS IN US\$)</b>							
<b>PROJECT NO:</b> SU0019	<b>TITLE:</b> Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening Program						
<b>Borrower:</b> Republic of Suriname <b>Executing Agency (EA):</b> Ministry of Regional Development	<b>Date of Board Approval:</b> 05 September 2001 <b>Date of Loan Contract Effectiveness:</b> 12 November 2001 <b>Date of Eligibility for First Disbursement:</b> 18 November 2002						
<b>Loan(s):</b> 1343/OC-SU <b>Sector:</b> Reform/Modernization of State	<b>Months in Execution</b> * from Approval: 88 * from Contract Effectiveness: 86						
<b>Lending Instrument:</b> Investment/Specific Investment Operation	<b>Disbursement Periods</b> <b>Original Date of Final Disbursement:</b> 12 November 2004 <b>Current Date of Final Disbursement:</b> 31 December 2008 <b>Cumulative Extension (Months):</b> 50 <b>Special Extensions (Months):</b> 0						
<b>Poverty Targeted Investment (PTI):</b> No <b>Social Equity (SEQ):</b> Yes <b>Environmental Classification:</b> A, B, or C	<b>Loan Amount(s)</b> * Original Amount: US\$ 4,900,000 * Current Amount: US\$ 4,698,800 * Pari Passu (if applicable): 70-30%						
	<b>Disbursements</b> * Amount to date: 100%						
	<b>Total Project Cost (Original Estimate):</b> US\$ 7,000,000						
	<b>Redirectioning</b> <b>Has this Project?</b> Received funds from another Project [ ] Sent funds to another Project [ ] N/A [x]						
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>To/From Project Number</th> <th>From Sub-Loan Number</th> <th>Amount</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount			
To/From Project Number	From Sub-Loan Number	Amount					
	* Current amount (adjusted for redirectioning):						
	<b>On Alert Status</b> <b>Is project currently designated "on alert" by PAIS:</b> No <b>If yes then why is the project on alert (DO , IP Ratings and/or relevant PAIS indicators):</b>						
	<b>Comments on relevance of "on alert" status for this project (if applicable):</b>						

<b>Summary Performance Classifications</b>				
DO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
IP	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (US)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)
SU	<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)

## **II. The Project**

### **a. Project Context**

Suriname has traditionally depended on a centralized government structure for delivery of basic services. Frustrated by the lack of responsiveness of this system to local demands, as well as its general ineffectiveness in meeting local demands, Surinamese society began to pressure for the creation of a local level of government. As a result, in the early 80s government responded by creating elected Councils in each of the country's Districts, a measure that was formalized and given greater standing with the passage of the 1987 Constitution which focused several chapters on principles of regional governance and, for the first time, defined Districts as an official level of government. Furthermore, in 1989 with the passage of the LRB, a first attempt was made at enabling local (District) government to begin managing their own revenues and budgets as well as deliver simple public services, such as secondary and tertiary roads, drainage, public markets, and solid waste collection. Notwithstanding these efforts, at the time of project preparation, the Bank found that little progress had been made with the implementation of the LRB, in part because of the weaknesses in the structure of the legislation-particularly as regards the creation of fiscal instruments for local governments- and in part because of the limited capacity of central government to support a systematic capacity building process with the Districts. Thus, the government approached the Bank with a view to enhance and amend the enabling legislative framework for Districts governments and, at the same time, create core institutional capacity that would allow them to begin implementation of their mandated functions. In short, to effectively implement the decentralization provision contained in the 1987 Constitution.

### **b. Project Description**

#### **i. Development Objective(s)**

The purpose of the program is to empower local government in Suriname with the core legal framework and the institutional capacity for fiscal self management and the capacity to begin to manage public works. Specifically the Program aims at: (i) promulgating new enabling legislation for autonomous revenue generation and budget management by District authorities; (ii) putting in place a core package of basic municipal management systems in each of the Districts, with particular emphasis in a pilot group of five Districts; (iii) improving the capacity of government stakeholders, particularly in the MRD; and (iv) undertaking preinvestment activities in support of a follow up development of the sector.

#### **ii. Components**

1. Intergovernmental reforms: This component supports the formulation and implementation of a set of core legislative reforms and related technical studies to provide the Districts with authority for fiscal self-management.
2. District capacity building: Starting with a pilot group of 5 Districts, this component aims to put in place in all the Districts a core of institution building systems covering: (i) administration and planning; (ii) budget and financial management; (iii) local revenue generation; and (iv) citizen participation. Once the District is certified by the program with respect to their capacity to manage the above systems, it is eligible to receive support from the program in capital investments projects.
3. Institutional strengthening of the sector: This component supports the organizational strengthening of the MRD, as the government lead agency. This include the formulation of a strategic development plan and organizational assessment for MRD, as well as the provision of institutional strengthening to other key stakeholders in the sector.

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4. Preinvestments: This component contains resources to prepare a second stage local government strengthening program.

**c. Quality -At- Entry Review (if applicable) N/A**

<b>Quality -At- Entry Review</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS) - 1	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully Satisfactory (S) - 2	<input type="checkbox"/> Less than Satisfactory (LS) - 3	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U) - 4

### III. Results

**a. Outcomes**

<b>ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (DO)</b>	
<b>Development Objective(s) (Purpose)</b>	
1. Empower local governments in Suriname with the core legal framework and institutional capacity for fiscal management and capacity to begin to manage public works.	
<i>Classification: HP</i>	
<b>Key Outcome Indicators</b>	
<b>Planned Outcomes at End of Project (EOP)</b>	<b>Outcomes Achieved</b>
1.1 5 Pilot Districts certified at Level II of institutional capacity by 12 November 2004 (Baseline 0 Districts at 12 November 2001)	<b>100% achievement</b> as to the number of units. End of project target was accomplished by 12 December 2006
1.2 2 Non- Pilot Districts certified at Level II by 12 November 2004 (Baseline 0 Districts at 12 November 2001)	<b>60 % achievement.</b> One non – pilot (Paramaribo) certified at Level 1 and partially at Level 2 by November 2008. One non-Pilot District (Sipalawini) certified at Level 1 by November 2008
<b>Reformulation.</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>X</b> <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	
<b>PPMR Retrofitting.</b> Indicate if and when the PPMR was retrofitted and explain any changes resulting from this exercise. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>X</b> <input type="checkbox"/> N/A	
<b>Summary Development Objective(s) Classification (DO):</b>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Highly Probable (HP)</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Probable (P) <input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP) <input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)	
Briefly justify DO classification, based on degree to which planned targets were met, explaining the differences between planned and achieved outcomes as well as any other relevant factors. Include references to evidence that can support these results.	
The stated development objectives were almost completely achieved by program's end. The GOS' plans to continue the decentralization process, as reflected in its commitment to the coming DLGP II Program, ensures the full achievement of the objectives.	
<b>Country Strategy.</b> Given the results described above, briefly discuss how the project contributed to the Bank's strategy in the country. In the IDB Country Strategy with Suriname 2007 – 2010, an specific priority area recommended for Bank activity is the strengthening of key management functions in Government to improve the quality of public spending. The Program involves the strengthening of key functions of public administration thus providing the Districts with the systems and the tools for efficiency and efficacy in the collection of revenues and in the spending of public resources.	

**b. Externalities**

Through the program GOS became aware of the benefits of a Cadastre as the basis for an improved real property tax system. With the support of the Dutch Government, a Cadastre is being developed with plans for

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its implementation in the year 2010. The DLGP I Program has been holding recent discussions with the Cadastre Program to facilitate its use at the level of the decentralized Districts.

**c. Outputs**

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS (IP)	
<b>Components (Outputs):</b>	
<p><b>Component 1: Inter-governmental Reforms</b>                      Total cost of Component 1: US\$ 389,200                      Counterpart: US\$ 51,400                      IDB: US\$ 337,800                      IDB Disbursement: 100%</p> <p><b>Classification: S</b></p>	
<b>Key Output Indicators:</b>	
<p><b>Planned End of Project Outputs</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eight technical background papers completed by November 2004 (baseline 0 papers November 2001).</li> <li>One hundred percent of Legislative bills approved by Nov 2004. (Baseline: 0% at Nov 2001).</li> <li>One hundred percent of Governance study for Sipaliwiny completed by Nov 2004. (Baseline 0% at Nov 2001)</li> <li>One hundred percent of Model Personnel Policy for Districts prepared and approved (Baseline: 0% at Nov 2001)</li> <li>One hundred percent of long term decentralization strategy prepared and approved by Council of Ministers.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Outputs Achieved End of Project</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Fully achieved</b> but with delays. (Nov. 2007 instead of Nov 2004)</li> <li><b>Fully achieved</b> but with delays (Nov 2007 instead of Nov. 2004)</li> <li><b>Fully achieved</b> but with delays. Governance study for Sipaliwini and Paramaribo ready for submission to GOS.</li> <li><b>50% achieved.</b> Personnel policy completed on Nov 2007, <b>and</b> it has not been submitted to GOS for approval.</li> <li><b>50% achievement.</b> Long term decentralization strategy completed on Nov 2007, it has been submitted to GOS for approval, <b>and</b> there is in fact a decentralization Government strategy represented by the continuation of the DLGP and all the decentralization legislation produced under DLGP I.</li> </ol>
<p>Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).                      Given that Districts personnel is paid by the central government and falls under its personnel regulations, Model personnel policy for Districts is still under discussion. <b>With regards to point 5, also the developed long term strategy is in discussion. And it</b> appears that the Government strategy in this regards is reflected in its commitment to District decentralization through the DLGP programs.</p>	
<p><b>Restructuring.</b> Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.</p> <p>[ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ] N/A</p>	
<p><b>Component 2: District Capacity Building</b>                      Total cost of Component 2: US\$2,923,000                      Counterpart: US\$ 706,200                      IDB: US\$ 2,216,800                      IDB Disbursement: 100%</p> <p><b>Classification: S</b></p>	
<b>Key Output Indicators:</b>	

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<p align="center"><b>Planned End of Project Outputs</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One hundred percent of Strategic Development Plan formulated and approved for pilot Districts by Nov 04 (Baseline 0% Nov 01).</li> <li>One hundred percent of District office rehab work completed and equipment purchased in pilot Districts and two non pilot Districts by Nov 04 (Baseline 0% Nov 01).</li> <li>One hundred percent of Budget and Financial Management and basic computer software installed in 2 non pilot Districts, as well as first phase training completed, all by Nov 04 (Baseline:0% at Nov 01).</li> <li>Three Pilots Districts present a budget execution report to their District's Council by end of year 2004). (Baseline: 0 Districts in 01).</li> <li>By Nov 2004, all Pilot Districts collecting more Rental Value Tax, Entertainment Tax than before.</li> <li>Citizen participation formulated and approved in two non pilot districts by Nov 2004 (Baseline 0 Districts in 2001).</li> <li>Capital works training projects formulated and implemented in 5 pilot Districts by Nov 2004 ( Baseline: 0 Districts in 2001)</li> </ol>	<p align="center"><b>Outputs Achieved End of Project</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>100% Achieved</b> in November and submitted for approval by the District Council.</li> <li><b>Fully achieved</b> but with delays (Nov 07 instead of Nov 04)</li> <li><b>Fully achieved</b> but with delays (Nov 07 instead of Nov 04).</li> <li><b>Fully achieved</b>, but with delays. (Nov 07 instead of Nov 04)</li> <li><b>No achievement.</b> With one or two exceptions there are no efforts to collect nor to increase collection of taxes.</li> <li><b>No achievement.</b></li> <li><b>Fully achieved</b> but with delays (Nov 2007 instead of Nov 2004)</li> </ol>
<p>Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable). Draft of Strategic Development Plans still being circulated among Districts is due to delays in contracting consultants and producing the studies. Shortcomings in the collection of taxes at the District level are mostly due to the considerable limitations of the Districts with their tax financial registering and collections systems. These limitations should be solved with the implementation of the TAS (Tax accounting System) developed by the DLGP I as well as the implementation of the Wan network system which will facilitate the clearing house function for transferring of tax revenues among Districts.</p>	
<p>[ ] N/A</p>	
<p><b>Restructuring.</b> Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.</p> <p>[ X ] N/A</p>	
<p><b>Component 3: Institutional Strengthening of Sector</b>          Total cost of Component 3: US\$ 386,300          Counterpart: US\$ 54,900          IDB: US\$ 331,400          IDB Disbursement: 100%</p> <p><u>Classification:</u> <b>HS</b></p>	
<p align="center"><b>Key Output Indicators:</b></p>	
<p align="center"><b>Planned End of Project Outputs</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fifty percent of recommendations from MRD study approved and implemented by Nov 2004. (Baseline 0% at Nov 2001)</li> </ol>	<p align="center"><b>Outputs Achieved End of Project</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>More than Fully Achieved.</b> One hundred percent of the recommendations from the MRD study implemented at this time.</li> </ol>
<p>Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).</p> <p>[ X ] N/A</p>	
<p><b>Restructuring.</b> Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.</p> <p>[ X ] N/A</p>	
<p><b>Component 4 Preinvestments</b>          Total cost of Component 4: US\$ 531,700          Counterpart: US\$ 194,700          IDB: US\$ 337,000          IDB Disbursement: 100%</p> <p><u>Classification:</u> <b>S</b></p>	
<p align="center"><b>Key Output Indicators:</b></p>	

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<b>Planned Ends of Project Outputs</b>	<b>Outputs Achieved End of Project</b>
1. One hundred percent of design of demand- driven project completed by Nov 04. (Baseline: 0% Nov 01) 2. One hundred percent of needs assessment inventory for capacity building and physical investment project completed by Nov 04 (Baseline: 0% at Nov 01). 3. One hundred percent of Draft Operating Regulations completed by Nov 04. (Baseline; (0% Nov 01).	1. <b>Fully achieved</b> by Nov 2007._  2. <b>Fully Achieved</b> by Nov. 2007  3. <b>Fully Achieved</b> by Nov 2007
Briefly explain differences between planned and actual outputs (if applicable).	
[ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ] N/A	
<b>Restructuring.</b> Indicate if this component was restructured (date of approval by Manager). Briefly discuss the consequences of these changes.	
[ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ] N/A	
<i>(In case of more components, create new row and complete.)</i>	
<b>Summary Implementation Progress Classification:</b>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S) <input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory(U) <input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)	

**d. Project Costs**

Components	Original Budget (US\$000)				Actual Expenses (US\$000)				Difference %		
	IDB	GOS	Total	%	IDB	GOS	Total	%	IDB	GOS	Total
<b>PPF</b>	800.0	0.0	800.0	11.43	858.8	0.0	858.8	11.55	7.35		7.35
<b>Intergovernmental Reforms</b>	300.0	100.0	400.0	5.71	337.8	51.4	389.2	5.24	12.60	(48.60)	(2.70)
<b>District Capacity Building</b>	2,400.0	600.0	3,000.0	42.86	2,216.8	706.2	2,923.0	39.32	(7.63)	17.70	(2.57)
<b>Institut. Strenght. of Sector</b>	400.0	100.0	500.0	7.14	331.4	54.9	386.3	5.20	(17.15)	(45.10)	(22.74)
<b>Preinvestment</b>	400.0	100.0	500.0	7.14	337.0	194.7	531.7	7.15	(15.75)	94.70	6.34
<b>Program Support</b>	500.0	800.0	1,300.0	18.57	611.0	1,290.3	1,901.3	25.57	22.20	61.29	46.25
<b>Financial Expenses</b>	100.0	400.0	500.0	7.14	6.0	438.1	444.1	5.97	(94.00)	9.53	(11.18)
<b>TOTAL</b>	4,900.0	2,100.0	7,000.0	100.0	4,698.8	2,735.6	7,434.4	100.0	(4.11)	30.27	6.21
<b>%</b>	70.00	30.00	100.00		63.20	36.80	100.00				

Briefly explain any differences. Actual expenses with loan resources were under budget or close to budget except for expenditures on the item Program support in which, due to the increase in the execution period, actual expenditures were 22% over budget. For the same item, the longer than planned execution period was also the reason for a 61% over budget expenses with local resources. GOS increased its share of financing for the preparation of the new program (item Preinvestment), with a resulting 95% over budget expenditure with local resources.

**IV. Project Implementation**

**a. Analysis of Critical Factors**

**Positive factors**

*Management team in charge of execution:* After a disappointing period up to midterm, (see negative factors), the program was efficiently run with satisfactory results by a team of local technical experts.

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*Establishment and application of a District Capacity Building Project Cycle Model:* The PIU management Team established and applied a model for the District Capacity Building Cycle which standardized processes and facilitated execution of the capacity building activities at the Districts.

*Existence of Mirror Teams at MRD and at MOF:* Because the PIU consists of a small technical team, the inclusion of MRD staff as a mirror team provided additional technical personnel to support the Districts in the execution of program activities. MOF personnel, on the other hand provided support in the assessment and certification of financial systems at the Districts.

### **Negative factors**

*Political Externalities:* Implementation suffered from long delays due to changes in the political scene. Three ministers from different constituencies have been involved with the project. PIU and CSU had to invest time and resources to convince the new ministers to buy into the program.

*Weak program management at the inception of the program:* The external consultant firms contracted at the beginning of the program assigned personnel with little or no experience in project management. The implementation approach suggested by the consultants focused on the application of models not tested in and not applicable to Suriname. This affected the quality of the PIP which was difficult to implement and consequently execution was delayed.

*Weak project monitoring system:* The project monitoring system designed by an external consultant firm was not user friendly. The PIU had to improvise with its own system. The monitoring system is now being improved with the help of a consultant contracted by the Bank.

*Weak financial management system:* There is a basic recording system and a package accounting system that is not in use. The financial office lacks the organization and manuals needed for good internal controls. Strengthening of the office is planned.

*Too many indicators:* Maybe because of the complexity of the program, the Logical Framework indicators resembled more a detailed action plan than true indicators. For instance there were over 30 midterm indicators which were prepared reportedly with little intervention of the executing agency personnel and which were hardly revised by the PIU during execution. This number of indicators added to the problems of poor project management support at the inception of the program, and political externalities overwhelmed the PIU with the resulting low level of execution up to midterm.

*Certification process:* The certification that a District has reached a satisfactory level of administrative and financial capacity is granted by the MRD and the MOF on the basis of the assessment and recommendations of the PIU, which at the same time is charged with providing the Districts with that capacity. Even it passes the test of the Government Audit Office, a party independent from the PIU, as agreed and stipulated by ministerial decree, the impression was that the PIU improvised to accelerate execution and achieve indicators, but in reality the PIU used a longer period (because of postponing of the Level-1 certification) to implement all requirements from the Program.

### **b. Borrower/Executing Agency Performance**

After a humble performance up to around midterm, the PIU execution performance improved drastically. In general the Unit has been successful in managing the interest of the various stakeholders: the ministers of MRD and of MOS, the Cabinet, the President and members of the National Assembly have been involved with the project at various stages of the Program. The PIU has conducted its work in agreement with the Program regulations and has been successful in planning and coordinating activities, in reaching goals established by indicators, and in monitoring and controlling the fulfillment of contractual clauses and of Bank's Policies. It is relatively well organized

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technically and has counted with a strong manager and the required resources and equipment. Its shortcomings are in the financial area where still needs strengthening of systems and of organization.

<b>Borrower/Executing Agency</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

### **c. Bank Performance**

See Annex 2

<b>Bank Performance</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Satisfactory (HS)	<input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory (S)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory (U)	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

## **V. Sustainability**

### **a. Analysis of Critical Factors**

*Continuous political support for Decentralization:* This is perhaps the most important factor for program sustainability because it will assure the continuation of resources and approval and implementation of legislation. At present the Program has political support at all levels of Government, which has been clearly demonstrated by the GOS request for a new and larger program (DLGP II) at present under preparation.

*Management and financial systems at Districts:* To manage the process of Decentralization, the Districts must have adequate management and financial systems. A key activity of the Program was to implement administrative and financial systems to enable the Districts the management of their own programs and resources. The continuing training and use of these systems will bring about the standardization of processes which in turns foments sustainability.

*Collection of tax Revenues by Districts:* The Interim financial Law approved as part of the Program assigns to the Districts the collection and use of several real property and business taxes. Tax collection is in its infancy as only a few Districts collect still small amounts of taxes, mainly due to the lack of appropriate systems. As collection levels increase, financial self reliance will increase with its positive effect on sustainability. Rental Property Tax has been eliminated as a revenue item from the national budget, and MOF has announced that its collection in all certified Districts should take place in 2009. Collection of this tax could increase as the result of the Cadastre system being now developed with the help of the Dutch Government.

*Inter-District Cooperation:* Cooperation among Districts is important as a source of sustainability, not only for the sharing of experiences, but also for the creation of a common body gathering political power. Government and the Districts are considering now the possible creation of a Inter- District body (a sort of association), on the basis of a study financed under DLGP I.

*Financial Law:* While the Interim Financial Law is adequate to regulate the financial aspects, GOS is considering at present the establishment of a permanent Law, an action that will strengthen sustainability.

*Citizen Information Centers:* Citizens are a source of political power to support the continuation of Decentralization. DLGP I organized Citizen Information Centers, where citizens can obtain information and voice their concerns and community needs.

## **b. Potential Risks**

*Lack of funds at Districts for maintenance of infrastructure works, roads and equipment:* DLGP I provided the Districts with some small infrastructure works (mostly small roads). It also provided the Districts with simple manuals to contract out maintenance and rehabilitation. Until Districts build up its financial tax base, its limited resources may affect required maintenance works. It is recommended that future infrastructure works contain resources for maintenance for the first 2 to 3 years, so as to give the Districts the time to build up its tax base.

*Delays in the implementation of the Tax Accounting System (TAS):* DLGP I developed the TAS system to provide the Districts with a system for collection, accounting and maintaining the contributors' data base. The package accounting system at present installed at the Districts by the program is of an administrative type and is not adequate for a tax system. A delay in the implementation of TAS at the Districts may affect negatively the collection of taxes and its use. The implementation of this system should be considered a priority by itself, or as a part of the new Bank's program.

## **c. Institutional Capacity**

DLGP I contributed to the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the PIU, of the MRD and of the Districts. At present the PIU has a good organization and resources with a strong manager, a solid technical team and it is in the process of strengthening its financial unit. At MRD, the new organizational study conducted in the context of the Program was approved by GOS and the MRD structure was adjusted to install units consonant with the Decentralization Program requirements. At the Pilot Districts, office infrastructure was rehabilitated, organizational structure and equipment was set up, manuals were developed and put in use and a basic budget financial management was implemented. This built up of capacity needs to be complemented with the installation of the Financial Tax system.

### **Sustainability Classification SU:**

<input type="checkbox"/> Highly Probable (HP)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Probable (P)	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Probability (LP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Improbable (I)
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## **VI. Monitoring and Evaluation**

### **a. Information on Results**

The Monitoring system for the Program foresaw a PIP, a project monitoring computerized system, semiannual progress indicators and a Midterm Review. Neither the PIP produced by the project management firm during several months of work, nor the monitoring system also produced by an external consultant worked out. The PIP reportedly lacked the DLGP project view and differed from the Bank's project report. The monitoring system was not user friendly and the PIU team had difficulty putting it in use. As a result the LFM became the basic tool for monitoring and controlling progress. However the LFM is not a tool for day to day monitoring and its abundance of indicators, quite a few of them reportedly developed without the input of the PIU- made monitoring work difficult. PIU improvised and set up a monitoring tool based on Excel. Periodic monitoring of progress was made through semiannual operating reports. Semiannually financial reports were prepared showing the status of the Revolving Fund.

A Midterm review was carried out by an international consultant in November 2004. The consultant found that only 6 indicators out of 36 midterm indicators had been achieved or partially achieved. The consultant also developed and applied a diagnostic instrument to assess the managerial and

administrative capacity gained by the 5 pilot Districts. This exercise showed low grades for managerial capacity and low to medium grades for administrative capacity, results that confirmed the low achievement numbers for the indicators. During the preparation of this PCR, the diagnostic instrument was again applied to two Districts: Wanica and Commewijne<sup>1</sup>. The results presented in Annex 3 shows a dramatic change with high grades for both Districts. These changes reflect the improvements that occurred in PIU and in the level of execution after midterm. In PIU for instance the local team of experts consolidated around a strong manager, coordination of actions with MRD increased, simpler tool for monitoring (based on excel and MS project) were of general use among the staff, frequency of staff meetings increased and semiannual reports to the Bank were presented. Nonetheless some problems remain with financial system reporting. These problems are not difficult to solve, but will require the Bank's financial support and guidance.

## **b. Future Monitoring and Ex-Post Evaluation**

This operation does not include an ex-post evaluation.

## **VII. Lessons Learned**

*Execution and disbursement period:* In programs involving legal reforms, government decentralization, or institutional strengthening, the period for execution and disbursement should be determined and established taking into account the project complexities, the risks involved and the social and political externalities foreseen. The three year execution period originally established for the program was obviously not sufficient given the complexities of the program.

*Project management support:* While such support is necessary in complex projects, care should be taken that qualified consulting personnel is selected and assigned and that the correct management models applicable to the country are used. PIU required the support of an experienced management support team to jump start execution, but the principal assigned by the firms lacked the qualifications in project management and the models of project management were applicable to municipalities of a fully developed country and not to Suriname Districts. As a result the program suffered delays.

*Number of indicators:* There should be a limited number of relevant indicators and the program beneficiaries and personnel responsible for accomplishing them should participate in their determination and definition. The program had about 35 midterm indicators and a similar number of end of project indicators. Reportedly, some of those indicators were unrealistic and were developed without PIU participation. Frustration and lack of ownership arose as a result.

*Certification process of Districts:* Following sound principles of internal control and transparency, the PIU should only be charged with implementing activities toward certification, and an independent technical party should provide the technical assessment for certification. **At present is the national Audit involved as independent partner.**

*Sustainability:* To promote sustainability and acceptance to change a future program should: (i) encourage citizen participation in regards to their views regarding Districts investment priorities; (ii) encourage inter-district cooperation and sharing of experiences through formal or informal associations; and (iii) continue with the training of staff in areas like municipal management, municipal accounting and finances, and personnel management, so as to develop a mass of potential municipal civil servants.

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<sup>1</sup> Wanica population around 40 thousand, had the midterm highest grades; Commewijne, population 25 thousand had one of the lowest.

**Annexes:**

1. Minutes from the Exit Workshop
2. Borrower Evaluation
3. Rapid Assessment on Managerial and Administrative Capacity for Districts Wanica and Commenwijne

**ANNEX 2**  
**Inter-American Development Bank**  
**Project Completion Report**  
**Borrower Evaluation**

Project Name: <i>Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening Program (DLGP)</i>	
Executing Agency(ies): Project Implementation Unit (PIU) within Ministry of Regional Development	
Borrower: The Government of Suriname	
Date of Project Approval: 5 September 2001	Date of Contract Effectiveness: 12 November 2001
Date of Borrower Evaluation: 31 October 2008	Expected Date of Exit Workshop:

Probability on Achieving its Development Objective(s):

Highly Probable (HP)       Probable (P)       Low Probability (LP)     Improbable (I)

Project Implementation:

Highly Satisfactory (HS)     Satisfactory (S)     Unsatisfactory (US)     Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Sustainability of Project Results:

Highly Probable (HP)       Probable (P)       Low Probability (LP)     Improbable (I)

Comments:

Please rate the Bank's overall performance during project preparation and execution. Factors to be considered include the extent to which the Bank facilitated a participatory project design, proposed adequate technical solutions to the problems identified, and responded to the needs of the Borrower (timeliness, selection of instrument type) as well as technical assistance (including informal and formal training) to Executing Agency, timeliness of Bank response and the Bank's flexibility to respond to emergency situations during project implementation. Your comments will be incorporated unedited into the PCR.

Highly Satisfactory (HS)     Satisfactory (S)     Unsatisfactory (US)     Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Good inter-act relation between PIU and Banks Representative, Operation Specialist, and Financial Department to support each other for the best performance. When necessary PIU and Bank discuss and solve concerns. Project meeting PIU, BANK and Ministry takes on regularly base place. There was bureaucracy within the Bank. Ongoing it improves.

*There was 'once' (March 2007) reason to make clear to the country office the following: We do apply on Bank's willingness to re-start the procedure to pay the declarations as submitted to the Bank as of January 2008 for direct payments within a couple of days. The PIU, MRD, MOF c.q. the GoS will not be accountable for claims from the contractors/creditors by not doing the payments in time. If the claims will be delayed a negative effect will be that the Local Service Providers, which we have created through this program, will lose their trust in the local government and its system. It is not wise to link their payment to activities of the past.*

*We have to prevent damage in the trust the community has in the Bank (don't take the risk for "defaulter"), specifically the trust the private sector has been demonstrated to have in the local governments created through the systems and mechanisms by implementing of the DLGP. Once this will be affected without failures from the side of the private sector and the local government as partner for the private sector we all*

*(GoS and Bank) will miss the goals we strive to achieve. Missing documents we can recover, but missing the goals and loosing the game is not something so easy to rehabilitate. We are very sorry for these kinds of feelings, especially when one will take into account how much and how rich our feeling of respect is for the Bank*

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Please rate your own overall performance during project preparation and execution.

Highly Satisfactory (HS)       Satisfactory (S)       Unsatisfactory (US)       Very Unsatisfactory (VU)

Comments:

Overall Management support from international firms/consultants failed, due to the replacement of ICMA with a Dutch Municipality Firm. The Program is politic sensitive and risky. The Role of the MD is pro-active and risk full. Bank's strategy supports this, but Bank's rules are not supporting it. While implementing, there were to many critical factors to deal with, also how to deal with the bureaucracy within the government, the politic, no budget for consensus building, to many action for corrections (to replace the international Dutch Firm, to replace the Resident Advisor, to terminate contracts of the RA and the Dutch Firm, to replace the Managing director, etc, Alert for issues affecting program implementations, combating of risks to prevent fear, and fail,

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Additional comments/suggestions for improving Bank performance in the future.

Based on lesson learned it's a high priority to pay attention to a qualified consultant in the field of project management with worldwide experience to assist the PIU in overall management of the program (on as need bases). He/she can do this as best in a close cooperation with the PIU and the Bank. Within the Bank there is need for a strong and high level qualified senior Operation Specialist to work very close with the PIU and the consultant assisting the PIU. The PIU will feel very comfortable to have support of a strong sector specialist and a qualified consultant with strong skills helping PIU in defining of projects, developing of plans and budgets, managing of plans and budgets, managing of critical issues, managing of changes without disordering of the program, managing of complicated communications, managing of risks, managing of human resources, managing of quality, managing of key figures, and responsible for quality control, in a fast moving way. This was missing during the whole life of DLGP-I. It was a wrong decision to hire an international firm, to appoint a resident advisor, and or to appoint an enormous team of international consultants to assist the PIU in managing the program. *Let's be warned duplicating this mistakes.*

**Project Completion Report  
Decentralization and Local Government Strengthening**

**Rapid Assessment on Managerial and Administrative Capacity for Districts Wanica and  
Commenwijne**

**I. Background and objectives**

- I.1 On November 2004, the Bank and the GOS contracted consultant Carlos Lacayo to conduct the Midterm review for the Program. He found that only 4 midterm indicators out of a total of 26 indicators related to District capacity building contained in the Logical Framework Matrix (LFM) have been partially achieved;<sup>1</sup> as well as only 2 out of a total 13 other midterm indicators<sup>2</sup>. In other words, the consultant found achievement or partial achievement for only 6 indicators out 36 midterm indicators established. In addition, to assessing the achievement of established indicators, consultant Lacayo applied a diagnostic instrument to evaluate at the level of the 5 pilot Districts their managerial and administrative capacity. The application of this instrument, using as criteria the presence of functions and operational features required for Level 2 certification- showed low grades for managerial capacity and low to medium grades for administrative capacity, which in fact supported the findings on the low level of indicator achievement.
- I.2 In contrast, the information contained in the PPMRs for 2007 and July 2008, showed a high level of achievement for the end of year program indicators. To audit these achievements, and to compare results with the midterm experience, as part of the PCR preparation the Lacayo's diagnostic instrument was reapplied in visits to the Districts Wanica and Commewijne.<sup>3</sup> The results are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 that follow, on which columns are presented for the grades obtained at the midterm review (November 2004), and for the recent visit to the above Districts (October 2008)

**II. Summary of findings**

- II.1 There is a high degree of output implementation achievement with the indicators related to organization, staffing and quality of the staffing, organizational manuals, administrative budget and accounting systems, and simple monitoring procedures. This achievements reflected in the PPMRs are supported by the results of the application of the Lacayo's diagnostic tool which shows a dramatic capacity increase since the midterm (especially for Commewijne), in the managerial and administrative functions. On the other hand, the application of the diagnostic tool in conjunction with an examination of the financial system at the above Districts, shows that problems still exists with the implementation of the system for collection, controlling and accounting of taxes. In this connection, the implementation of Tax Accounting System (TAS) developed in the context of DGLP I, should be given an urgent priority.

<sup>1</sup> Mid-Term Program Evaluation: Pilot Districts Management-Governance Systems, Carlos Lacayo, November 2004, pages 5 and 6.

<sup>2</sup> Idem, page 23.

<sup>3</sup> Wanica obtained the highest grades in the Midterm evaluation. Commewijne obtained one of the lowest.

<b>TABLE 1. MANAGERIAL CAPACITY MEASUREMENTS</b>					
<b>Functions</b>	<b>Operational features</b>	<b>Wanica</b>		<b>Commewijne</b>	
		<b>Oct 2008</b>	<b>Nov 2004</b>	<b>Oct 2008</b>	<b>Nov 2004</b>
1.1 District Implementation Plan (DIP)	1.1.1 DIP basic guidelines developed (5P). If Plan is comprehensive and covers both administrative and legal (political) bodies (2P); revenues sources by year and allocation of operational expenditures by year and by organizational area of the local government (2P); general description of organizational setting and challenges and that of the community social and economic development problems and challenges (2P); and that of inter- institutional and civil society coordination mechanisms and challenges (2P). <b>(Quality of design, process and supervision).</b> Max score: 15 P; Min: 0 P	9	2	7	0
	1.1.2 DIP is effectively developed according to normative an actual execution reaches more than 40% of total (20P); otherwise (0P).	20	0	20	0
	1.1.3 Effectiveness of follow up mechanisms: Evidence of periodic progress report evaluating benchmarks against real execution and measures taken (5P). Progress report reviewed in District Council (5P); PIU received progress report, recommendations and actions were taken (5P) <b>(Quality of process and supervision)</b> Max score: 15 P; Min: 0 P	5	0	5	0
	1.1.4 If total Training in DIP Learning by doing of more than 8 hours (10P); 8 hours (5P); 4 hours (2.5P); Otherwise (0P). <b>(Quality of Training)</b>	5	0	5	0
	<b>1.1 Total (of a Maximum of 60P)</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>0</b>
Key Competences Elevated and Implemented	1.2.1 % of total key compulsory (bylaws) competences implemented. If more than 90% (5P); 70%-90% (2.5P); Otherwise (0P).	2.5	0	2.5	0
	1.2.2 % of total key delegated (inter-institutional agreements or central GOS resolutions) competences implemented. If more than 90% (5P); 70%-90% (2.5P); Otherwise (0P)	0	0	0	0
	<b>1.2 Total (of a Maximum of 10 P)</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>0</b>
1.3 Qualifications of DA and background of District Commissioner (See Table A)	1.3.1 Average score of candidates is 70 or more points (10P); if 50 to 69 points (5P); Otherwise (2.5P). <b>Quality of process and supervision apply only to DA.</b>	10	10	10	0
	1.3.2 Total training in basic management and administration (learning by doing) of more than 12 hours (10P); 8 – 12 hours (5P); 4 hours (2.5P); Otherwise (0P). <b>(Quality of training)</b>	2.5	0	2.5	0
	<b>1.3 Total (Of a Maximum of 20P)</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>0</b>
Rate of Revenue growth	1.4.1 Rate of growth over the last three years is more than 40% (10P); 5%-20% (2.5P); Otherwise (0P)	0	0	0	0
	<b>1.4 Total (Of a Maximum of 10P)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Grand Total score (of a Maximum of 100 P)</b>		<b>54</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>0</b>

TABLE 2. ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY MEASUREMENTS					
Functions	Operational Features	Wanica		Commewijne	
		Oct 2008	Nov 2004	Oct 2008	Nov 2004
2.1 Administrative Operating Manual	2.1.1 Administrative Operating Manual or Procedures exist (1P). If organizational chart of District bodies (and units) and general functions of each (1P). Personnel selection and hiring procedures (1P). Job Descriptions (1P). Performance and evaluation reporting (1P). Max Score: (5P)	3	3	3	0
	2.1.2 Manual is 100% operational and normative are of practical application (5P); more than 50% (2.5P); less than 50% (0P)	5	0	2.5	0
	2.1.3 Total Training in Administrative Procedures (learning by doing) of more than 4 hours (5P); 4 hours (2.5P); Otherwise (0P).	2.5	5	2.5	5
	<b>2.1 Total (of a maximum of 15 P)</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>
2.2 Budget and Financial Management-BFM Manual	2.2.1 If BFM Manual exists (2P). If description of basic internal control (2P). Basic accounting, payment and procurement procedures (2P). Financial reporting and auditing (2P). Standard forms of controls and reports (2P) Max score: 10P; Min: 0P	8	6	8	6
	2.2.2 Manual is 100% operational and normative are of practical applications (5P); more than 50% (2.5P); less than 50% (0P)	2.5	2.5	2.5	0
	2.2.3 Total Training in BFM (learning by doing) of 20 or more hours (10P); 8 or more hours (5P); 4 hours (2.5P); Otherwise (0P)	10	10	5	10
	<b>2.2 Total (of a maximum of 25P)</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>16</b>
2.3 Tax Administration System (TAS) Manual	2.3.1 TAS manual exists (2P). If description of procedures regarding: classification (1P), appeals (1P), sanctions (1P); reporting forms of accruals receivables and arrears (1P). Definitions of operational circuits by each category of taxes and fees-participants, processes, normative, control formats (2P). Reporting forms by category of taxes and fees (1P). Max score: 10P; Min:0P	0	0	0	0
	2.3.2 Manual is 100% operational and normative are of practical application (5P); More than 50% (2.5P); less than 50% (0P).	0	0	0	0
	2.3.3 Total Training in TAS (learning by doing) of 20 or more hours (10P); 8 hours or more (2.5P); Otherwise (0P)	0	0	0	0
	<b>2.3 Total (Of a maximum of 25 P)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Basic computerized systems	2.4.1 If software or other computerized is used to control: progress in program execution (2P); personnel assistance, vacations, etc (1P); vehicle use and gas report (1P): BFM (3P); TAS (3P); citizen participation by each design mechanism (3P); dates of staff participation by training category (2P). Max score: 15P, Minimum 0P.	3	3	3	0
	2.4.2 If training in basic computer use and design of excel applications, etc (learning by doing) of 40 hours or more (5P); 8 hours or more (2.5P); Otherwise (0P)	2.5	5	2.5	2.5
	<b>2.4 Total (Of a maximum of 20P)</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Qualifications of staff. (See Table A)	2.5.1 Average score of candidates is 70 or more points (15P); if 50-69 Points (10P); Otherwise (2.5P)	15	15	15	10
	<b>2.5 Total (Of a Maximum of 15P)</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Grand Total score (of a Maximum of 100 P)</b>		<b>51.5</b>	<b>49.5</b>	<b>44.0</b>	<b>33.5</b>

**Table A**

**Parameters used to evaluate qualifications of key District staff**

	<b>Description</b>	<b>Points</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Academic Background</b>	<b>Max 40 P</b>
A.1	Master or higher	40 P
A.2	University degree	30 P
A.3	Intermediate diploma	20 P
<b>B.</b>	<b>Working experience in related position</b>	<b>Max 40 P</b>
B.1	Experience > 10 Years	40 P
B.2	Experience >5 Years, but < 10 Years	30 P
B.3	Experience < 5 Years	20 P
<b>C.</b>	<b>Expertise</b>	<b>Max 20P</b>
C.1	Computer	5 P
C.2	Planning	5 P
C.3	Managing or coordinating	5 P
C. 4	Community Participation	5 P
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100 P</b>